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MEGA-PROJECTS PLANNING IN THE CIRCUMPOLAR NORTH 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS AND ECO-SOCIAL RELIABILITY 
EX-ANTE REVIEW OF THE VUOSAARI HARBOR CASE 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Research interest of MPPCN  
 
The Vuosaari Harbor Endeavor (VHE) from Finland has been chosen to one of the cases 
examined in connection with the Mega-projects Planning in Circumpolar North -research 
project (MPPCN). In connection with VHE a new large scale cargo harbor was planned and 
constructed in an ecologically and socially significant and delicate environment. The new 
harbor has been in operation since 2008. It took over 40 years from initial ideas to harbor 
opening. The history of VHE, with all its environmentally motivated struggles, conflicts and 
crises and other nuances, provides an excellent case for the interest of MPPCN to examine 
how a mega-project becomes deliberated, planned and implemented in such a manner that 
technical, economic, ecological and social expectations are recognized equally and governed 
reliably into positive outcomes with minimum harms.  
 
1.2. VHE as an informative mega-project case 
 
Mega-project is commonly conceptualized as a project that involves high costs and has great 
direct and indirect impacts on the environment, people and economy. By such 
conceptualization the VHE is definitely a mega-project. The VHE is one of the largest 
infrastructure projects ever carried out in Finland. The construction of a large scale cargo 
harbor in the outskirts of Helsinki, with its traffic connections and associated operation and 
service structures, is the nucleus of the VHE. Additionally the reconstruction of the old harbor 
sites, such as those in central Helsinki, into residential and business areas and community 
structure development more widely are essential components of the VHE. Furthermore, the 
VHE in connection with its network deliberation, planning orchestration and project 
implementation phases has incorporated other environmentally motivated components, such 
as upgrading of waste areas, construction of new nature, cleaning of old environmental 
hazards on dry land and in sea bed sediments, renewal of environmental norms, testing of 
environmental legislation, creating innovative technical solution and governance practices, all 
in collaboration between the project owners and the environmental administration, science 
and other stakeholders.   
 
The investment cost of the new harbor and its traffic connections alone was some 700 M€. 
The estimated inhabitant area of the new suburbs to be constructed in the freed old harbor 
traffic areas is some 30 000. In the eastern border area between Helsinki and its neighbor 
municipalities a development snowballing has been pushed into motion in which some 30 000 
inhabitants are being settled into co-living with highly valued nature, cultural heritage and 
recreation sites. The total employment by the harbor and its related logistic activities is some 
4000. The harbor area is 150 ha and the length of traffic tunnels 20 km. In fact the whole 
capital city region of Finland is recipient in way or another of the social impacts of VHE. 
 
   
 
The City of Helsinki is the project owner of the harbor itself and the State of Finland is the 
project owner of the traffic connections. A large number of private companies and specialist 
organizations have participated in studies, planning assignments and implementation contracts 
of VHE. Studies, planning, supervision, management and monitoring have engaged some 100 
parties and construction activities some 75 parties so far. Besides the projects of CH and 
State, VHE has involved projects of the harbor operators in ramping up of their operations, as 
well as projects of the logistics related and other companies building their businesses in the 
Vuosaari Harbor Centre. These private projects have engaged another 50 parties. Wide 
collaboration in various activities has generated new thinking, innovative solutions and 
precedent cases within the umbrella of sustainable infrastructure development.  
 
The year 2002 was a turning point in the history of VHE.  In 1996 the Finnish Ministry of 
Environment (MinE) had denied ratification of the traffic area plans for the new harbor, as 
they were in obvious conflict with the Natura 2000 Network site of EU, under planning in the 
same neighborhood. Regional planning for traffic areas was restarted immediately in 1996, 
but first in June 2002 could the Supreme Administrative Court (SAC) rule the ratification of 
the respective regional plan final. That ruling was the most important threshold ruling for the 
harbor in Vuosaari. Only after this ruling, further planning was on realistic basis again. 
 
At the heights of the legal twisting on the harbor versus Natura, in February 2002, Hukkinen 
and Roe discussed the prevailing antagonistic set-up in Helsingin Sanomat. They 
conceptualized Vuosaari harbor and the neighbouring Natura as a single industrial ecosystem, 
subject to co-evolution and co-management. According to them, deliberations on VHE 
conventionally had pit the ecological values of Natura against the social benefits obtained 
from the new harbor, even though one may argue that the maintenance of ecosystem values of 
of the Natura area in fact requires the harbor. The harbor had been cast as a choice between 
the preservation of aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems if the harbor is not built versus the 
enhancement of the economy, employment and housing if the harbor is built. EIA of HMP 
had concluded that not building the harbor would mostly benefit the aquatic environment, 
terrestrial flora and fauna, groundwater, and recreation, whereas building the harbor would 
mostly benefit the economy, employment, housing and services, health and quality of life, 
scenic values, and air quality. One might infer that the harbor would bring destruction to 
Natura, and that blocking the harbor from becoming operational would preserve the protected 
values of Natura. One could, however, anticipate that without the harbor the Natura area 
would be threatened by the rapid suburban development around it. On the other hand, one is 
entitled to assume that the harbor could be built and operated in such a way that it in fact 
secures the ecological values of Natura. The preservation of the values of Natura depends on 
what happens in its surroundings, the harbor included. The crux is the way how the harbor 
construction and operation and the Natura area are managed in relation to each other.  
 
During its history VHE has provoked relentless critic for its environmental wrongdoings. In 
the public polemic the harbor construction has been accused for “raping the environment” and 
for courting with ecological and human health catastrophe. On the other hand, VHE has been 
praised for its environmental excellence. The project is advertised as an undertaking that has 
paid extraordinary attention to the ecological and social concerns. The VHE has been 
advertised as the most environment friendly harbor construction ever, leading to a model 
harbor that is in harmony with its eco-social landscape. None of these extreme expressions 
depicts the truth representatively.  The joint technical economic, ecological and social 
excellence rather appears in a combination of nuanced success and failure features, associated 
with the processes from the first ideas to the operational readiness, and even more in the final 
   
 
outcomes. VHE provides excellent material for examining how such success and failure 
nuances appear in various governance contexts of a particular infrastructure development 
case.  
 
1.3. Some definitions for the purpose of this study 
 
The above article by Hukkinen and Roe gives a good lead to understanding and defining some 
fundamental conceptualizations for the purpose of this study.  
 
Expectations: Technical, economic, ecological and social expectations evolve and 
accumulate along the network deliberations towards a concrete plan, and become recorded as 
a representative collection of expectations. At a certain point of time deliberations lead to that 
Plan which is put under public scrutiny in EIA (HMP in this case). In EIA a large number of 
citizens and institutions have an opportunity to get their expectations on what to achieve and 
what to avoid recorded. The expectations as in EIA become refined in subsequent plans and 
public struggles on them. In this study the expectations as in EIA, complemented by 
redefinitions from the most critical struggles, conflicts and crises in later stages, are taken as 
the fundamental comparison basis for verification of whether VHE has been governed eco-
socially reliably or not.  
 
Endeavor: A project by definition leads thinking to a linear planning-implementation 
sequence, separation of the project from its environment and separation of the project as the 
cause and its impacts as the effect. Here the endeavor is understood as the carrier of all those 
EIA expectations that were associated with the alternative chosen for further steps, plus 
carrier of expectations resulting from the subsequent planning and implementation struggles, 
without strict segregation between within and without. VHE here is the entirety of initiatives, 
processes, projects, actors and outcomes associated with initiating, planning, constructing and 
commissioning of the new harbor in Vuosaari with its traffic connections, as well as all the 
transformations in all the ecological and social landscape components, transformed in the 
same context.  
 
Eco-social landscape (ESL): In usual infrastructure endeavor conceptualizations the 
endeavor (changing) and the environment (status quo) easily become conceptualized as 
opponents to each other, as we see in the discussion of Hukkinen and Roe above. Here the 
endeavor and its components are seen rather as embedded in their ecological and social (eco-
social) landscapes. The eco-social landscapes of VHE are conceptualized here as 
heterogeneous and constantly transforming combinations of multiple ecosystems in human 
interaction, under social pressures and control attempts. The harbor construction appears just 
as a peak of social pressures and control attempts in the subjected eco-social landscapes. 
 
Governance: Generally, governance is about the manner in which something significant is 
developed, guided and controlled towards purpose by methods of management and systems of 
regulation, with reliance on precaution, learning, institutional evolution, participatory 
approaches, and awareness of civil society. Here, in addition to the previous, the governance 
is conceptualized with particular reference to the features most relevant to infrastructure 
development. In such a conceptualization, initially open network deliberation is expected 
gradually to narrow the differences and lead to a collectively supported project plan, which 
then is expected to achieve its goals through project management type of approach 
dominantly.  
 
   
 
Eco-socially reliable governance: Here the governance of VHE is conceptualized eco-
socially reliable if it becomes deliberated, planned and implemented in such a manner that 
technical, economic, ecological and social expectations are recognized equally and governed 
into positive outcomes with equal attention. If eco-socially reliable, the governance of VHE 
achieves convergent orientation and trust of the public, meets the socially constructed 
ecological and social expectations and delivers the harbor for traffic according to the design 
specifications. Furthermore there must be evidence years after the harbor commissioning that 
the outcomes enjoy wide acceptance and trust of the public, that no unexpected ecological or 
social harm has been built-in, and that the harbor performs to specification continually. 
 
1.4. This study 
 
At first this study makes a brief summary of VHE from initial ideas to the harbor opening. 
 
Secondly the expectations resulting from EIA of HMP are investigated thoroughly. These 
socially constructed expectations form the fundamental reference basis for the outcomes 
comparison.  
 
Thirdly a brief account is given of how the most crucial expectations of EIA have been 
influential in the most critical struggles, conflicts and crises of the project and how the initial 
expectations have become refined in connection with subsequent planning, permitting, 
implementation and monitoring.   
 
Fourthly the results of the monitoring programs and the other indications of project 
performance and outcomes are verified and compared to the expectations above. 
  
Finally, based on the above, conclusions are drawn on whether the processes and outcomes 
give indications of eco-socially reliable governance and if so what have been major 
contributors to such an achievement.  
 
 
 
 
2. Lessons learned from EIA of HMP  
 
The EIA of the HMP of Helsinki and that of the Kantvik harbor plan by Finnlines and its 
associates were the first major assessments under the new EIAAct in Finland. Besides being 
significant for the continuation of VHE, EIA of HMP was referred to be an important 
reference case of the future EIA practice in general.  
 
EIAAct defines environmental impacts as direct or indirect impacts of an activity or an 
endeavor on human health, living conditions and wellbeing, on soils, waters, air, climate, 
vegetation, organisms and biodiversity, on community structure, buildings, landscape, urban 
view and cultural heritage, on use of natural resources, and on reciprocal relations between 
the previous ones. In EIA all these impacts must be assessed for all planned alternatives, zero-
alternative included and processed into conclusions for decision making.  
 
The EIA program of Helsinki on HMP was introduced to the public according to the 
legislation. Besides official statements, it obtained some 50 critical remarks from citizens and 
   
 
their associations. The program was criticized for its alternatives setting, impact area 
definition, citizens participation and alternatives comparison, for instance. It was claimed that 
a nationally important project was planned to be assessed in a local context only. REC in its 
capacity as the coordinating authority accepted the EIA program, however, with some 
comments. REC stated, for instance, that “the law as present does not demand assessment of 
harbor activity and related environmental aspects more widely than from the project 
proponent’s own perspective”. Importantly, REC emphasized that “the assessment shall pay 
particular attention to the remarks given by the water and museum authorities and nature 
conservation associations”.  
 
EIA of HMP was carried out and the report produced by the assessment group headed by 
CH’s Director for the Environment. All pertinent departments of the city administration were 
represented in the group. Neighboring municipalities were represented in the group, too, as 
were the traffic departments of the state. Citizen and organizations wanted to have their 
representation in the group, too, but this did not materialize.  
 
A senior officer of REC acted as an advisor to the assessment group. MinE emphasized how 
the EIA process is separate from the project proponent’s planning process and how the role of 
the coordinating authority is to ensure that these two processes are kept separate. This 
separation was not questioned in EIA of HMP. 
 
In connection with its EIA, Helsinki carried out a citizen inquiry, besides numerous other 
investigations, and used its feedback widely in the mathematical model aiding for EIA 
conclusions. Based on the model, Helsinki concluded that “one concludes in favor of the 
harbor transfer to Vuosaari if 60 % of the total valuing is put on the human and social impacts 
and 40 % at maximum is put on the nature impacts”.  
 
In several opinions the model and its way of using the citizen inquiry for conclusions was 
questioned. Critics claimed that the harbor transfer was anyway justified dominantly on 
techno-economic grounds, without adequate weight on obvious environmental detriments, on 
their avoidance and mitigation, leave alone monitoring of impacts. Citizens, particularly in 
Vuosaari and along the traffic connections in Vantaa and Sipoo anticipated a variety of 
negative impacts in their neighborhood. Some citizen associations and landowners used 
environmental lawyers in elaboration their opposing statements.  
 
Two separate project proponents had their competing harbor project in progress in the early 
90s. Besides CH, Metropolitan Harbor Oy, headed by Finnlines was planning for their 
competing harbor in Kantvik, west of Helsinki. A real comparison of alternatives as stipulated 
in EIAAct was not possible because there were two separate project proponents. REC aimed 
to ensure some comparison anyway. Each proponent had introduced its EIA program 
separately. But in its conclusions to both of them REC demanded coordination of the EIA 
report publishing and processing. REC requested EIA reports from both proponents 
simultaneously and invited statements from the authorities and associations respectively. REC 
received around 40 opinions on the EIA report of Helsinki only or on both reports together.  
 
EIA of HMP was seen widely as a precedent case that would show the way for future EIAs. 
Despite of REC’s efforts to generate some comparison, EIA of HMP and that of its rival 
jointly demonstrated the need for an EIA that would assess respective infrastructure 
endeavors at a higher regional or national level. The EIA report of VHE was blamed to be a 
bad precedent in terms of its alternatives setting, impact area definition, genuineness of its 
   
 
public hearing, manipulative way of coming to pre-decided conclusions, lack of real 
comparison and far too low attention to impact prevention, mitigation and monitoring. These 
issues demand particular attention in other upcoming EIAs.  
 
REC concluded in its final statement on EIA of HMP that “the assessment takes the feedback 
of the program sufficiently into account. According to some statements the EIA report is good 
enough and in conformity with the EIAAct, while some others regard the report as 
insufficient and biased. Many statements claim that the investigations of the railway 
alternatives, dumping of the dredging masses and impacts on community structure have been 
left at too a general level. Most of those submitting opinions oppose the harbor location in 
Vuosaari. It is positive that the assessment covers the entire endeavor. This makes it possible 
to form a big picture of the entire endeavor and of its environmental impacts. Taking the 
planning status into account, the assessment report, despite of its generality, is sufficient.”  
 
Even though EIA of HMP was approved by REC, statements and opinions proved that much 
investigation and twisting was left into the subsequent processes. The eventual future of VHE 
was seen as a great complication, in which it is impossible yet to foresee all impacts, many 
impacts involve value based ambiguities, interests of various stakeholders collide, many 
impact contain uncertainties, and many important issues will unveil only gradually along the 
upcoming processes. Impacts would materialize in different scales in different points of time 
in different environments, that themselves are subject to changes all the time. Authorities in 
concert required more detailed plans, investigations, assessments, prevention, mitigation and 
monitoring as necessary preconditions.  
 
 
3. Expectations established in HMP and EIA 
 
 
3.1. Community structure ambitions and worries 
 
3.1.1 Harbor transfer driving structural development of Helsinki 
 
GP92 of Helsinki reserved a site for the cargo harbor in Vuosaari. The areas of the old West 
Harbor and North Harbor, as well as their railways junction in Pasila were reserved for 
housing and business construction. As the traffic areas of the eventual harbor reached outside 
the Helsinki territory, they were processed further through regional planning and were 
included in the urban regional plan 1992 of HPR. At the time of EIA in 1994, the ratification 
of this plan was still pending.  
 
According to GP92, HMP and the EIA report, the harbor transfer, besides advancing the 
international image of Helsinki as a modern seaside and business city, would bring significant 
advantages to the community structure development and housing construction in the city. It 
would contribute to a closer community structure and bring subsequent environmental 
benefits. The environmental authorities and regional co-operation organizations in their 
statements were agreeable with this statement, and maintained that the harbor transfer would 
not only contribute to closer community structure inside Helsinki only but would act as a 
useful driver for similar development more widely in the region, too.  
 
   
 
On the other hand, many statements and opinions claimed that the environmental benefits 
reaped from reconstruction of the old harbor areas were obviously over-dimensioned and 
uncertain. It was blamed that the eventual environmental impacts caused by the traffic after 
reconstruction of the old harbors were neglected in the assessment far too much. Questions 
were raised, too, whether such housing and business construction is needed in first place. 
Furthermore, numerous doubts were presented on whether the old harbor areas, where soil 
had been contaminated by waste tipping at first and then by harbor traffic, could be 
reasonably, if at all, transferred into healthy and lucrative housing areas. 
 
In the EIA program of CH had justified the harbor transfer by the argument that the present 
harbor sites would not allow for development of harbor activities in accordance with capacity 
requirements while such development would be possible at the abandoned shipyard site in 
Vuosaari. This argument raised claims that the site available in Vuosaari would not allow 
such development either. In its EIA report CH assured sufficient area for any needful harbor 
development in Vuosaari by extensive sand filling there. That view was no more challenged 
in commenting of the actual EIA report. Attention was instead turned into environmental 
consequences of the extensive sand lifting, transport and filling suggested in the EIA report.  
 
3.1.2 Community structure and planning in a wider perspective  
 
In its EIA report CH described the land use and planning situation at various levels of 
planning hierarchy. CH also gave indications how the present land use situation and planning 
status affected VHE planning, and vice versa which implications VHE planning would have 
at regional, general and local planning levels.  
 
Statements and opinions criticized the EIA report of CH for poor recognition and clarification 
of the preconditions that the prevailing regional and other land use plans set for planning of 
the harbor traffic connections. This was referred to be a very serious bottleneck when the so 
far unorganized land use conditions in the border area of Helsinki, Vantaa and Sipoo and the 
inertia of the planning hierarchy were both taken into account.  
 
Significance of the harbor transfer issue for the structural development of the southern 
Finland was widely noted, and the decision makers were alerted to be far-sighted in the 
subsequent decisions. Views were given on how the outgoing of the harbor from the down 
town Helsinki facilitates for community structure development there, but doubts were raised 
whether such development is necessary or sustainable. Views were given how the harbor east 
of Helsinki would generate structural development in eastern region and prompt the 
reorganization of land use planning there, but doubts were raised whether such development 
would be necessary, desirable or sustainable. Respective considerations were given if the new 
harbor would be located instead west of Helsinki. 
 
Many statements were agreeable with CH’s argument that the harbor transfer to Vuosaari is 
conducive to community structure that is more compact and obviously more sustainable, too. 
Several opinions, however, were worried about the car traffic impacts generated by the 
housing and business construction in the old harbor areas. The EIA report was criticized 
widely for its negligent attention to all car traffic implications in the down town, caused by 
such construction.  
 
   
 
As far as citizens are concerned, citizens in the down town Helsinki preferred to get the 
harbor away and those in Vuosaari, Vantaa and Sipoo preferred not to receive it. REC in its 
statement supported CH by mentioning that the harbor transfer would improve the quality of 
living environment in the city centre. But still in many opinions doubts were raised on air 
quality and living quality in residential areas built on contaminated grounds. Detriments to the 
so far clean, quiet and green residential, nature and recreation areas in Vuosaari, Vantaa and 
Sipoo, instead, were regarded obvious.  
 
3.2. Critical ecological and social constraints for the harbor in Vuosaari 
 
As far as the ecological and social constraints for the harbor in Vuosaari are concerned, 
following kind of questions characterize the worries raised in the statements and opinions on 
the EIA report.  
 
● Which ecological, human health or other environmental constraints must definitively 
be taken into account in planning, permitting, construction and commissioning of the 
harbor in Vuosaari, with all its necessary structures, facilities and functions?  
● How well such constraints are known, recognized, understood, valued and taken into 
account in the plans and decision making?  
 
3.2.1. Natura site as neighbor  
 
In a great majority of all statements and opinions, reference was made to the biodiversity 
protection requirements in general, and to that of the Porvarinlahti-Mustavuori area in 
particular. Numerous statements and opinions blamed that in its EIA report CH had by-passed 
the EU’s Bird and Nature directives far too lightly. Warnings were raised that the obvious 
appeal processes, based on these directives and on the respective national legislation, would 
form a fundamental risk to the total endeavor. The said legislation, together with plans to 
establish a Natura 2000 Network site in the immediate neighborhood of the considered 
harbor, was suggested as an obvious hinder that would prevent the harbor construction there. 
The Natura related processes were believed to prolong harbor plans considerably anyway.  
 
REC joined the nature conservation associations and many others in emphasizing that the 
EU’s Bird and Nature directives were effective and binding in the VHE case, particularly 
because the Porvarinlahti-Mustavuori area was part of the site being included in the Natura 
2000 Network, protected under the provisions of these directives. Harbor users urged the 
project proponents to include the EU’s Bird and Nature directives and the upcoming Natura 
development in their analysis of the most serious constraints and bottlenecks.  
 
3.2.2. Biodiversity values and their protection more widely   
 
In the citizen inquiry for the EIA report, 60 % of all answerers regarded impacts on nature 
very significant. Of all answerers, 50 % deemed the significant impacts as negative. Of those 
who classified themselves as opponents to the Vuosaari harbor, 70 % saw significant impacts 
on nature negative.  
 
   
 
For its EIA report CH collected a summary of relevant biodiversity sites, of their protection 
status, and of their natural values inventories so far. CH also clarified which nature sites 
would be covered or otherwise affected by the harbor and its traffic connections. 
 
Statements and opinions on the EIA report throughout noted that the harbor transfer to 
Vuosaari would cause deprivation of unspoiled nature. Protection of the Porvarinlahti-
Mustavuori area, highly valued for its birdlife and grove vegetation, was found most critical 
and most seriously threatened. It was claimed that even though impacts of the road and 
railway there would be known, valuing of all impacts would remain difficult. 
 
The Porvarinlahti-Mustavuori area was not the only site highly valued for its biodiversity. 
Spoiling impacts of the planned harbor on several other bird wetlands, protected islands and 
other protected marine sites were regarded grossly harmful.   
 
The harbor and its traffic connections were blamed to spoil and split important spheres of 
nature, from where the whole eastern Helsinki obtains its flora and fauna complementation. It 
was commonly claimed, too, that despite of earlier conservation attempts and rich study 
material, all valuable biodiversity sites, especially beyond the Helsinki border, had not yet 
been researched, inventoried and monitored sufficiently.  
 
3.2.3. Protection of water resources along the harbor road and railway 
 
All land traffic connection alternatives were bound to touch one or another area important for 
its groundwater resources. CH in its EIA report presented ground water conditions and 
respective impacts on them in areas were alternative road and railway alignments were 
proposed. Statements and opinions demanded more detailed ground and rock water 
investigations and protection proposals, before road and railway alignments could be finally 
decided and before further planning or permitting could proceed.  
 
Rock and soil construction activities as well as the harbor traffic were in numerous statements 
and opinions claimed to involve risks of contaminating important, and in the capital city area 
scarce ground water resources. If tunnel solutions were chosen, their construction was 
furthermore claimed to involve dangers of dropping ground water and rock water tables, 
degrading wells and watersheds, drying vegetation at important nature protection sites, and 
moving foundations and cracking buildings at residential areas of Vantaa.  
 
3.2.4. Protection of the marine environment, water quality and fisheries 
 
In the feedback to the EIA program, the presentation of CH was seen weak on protection the 
marine environment as a whole, even though voluntary monitoring was going on. In the EIA 
phase sand lifting and sand filling plans were presented more extensively and the assessment 
of marine construction impacts was based on rather extensive investigation and monitoring 
material. Water, environmental and fisheries authorities, however, claimed that impacts of the 
waterway construction and traffic on the marine ecology were not assessed satisfactorily, that 
the assessment paid too little attention to impacts on fisheries and fishing, and that blurring 
impacts of the extensive sand movements were not covered adequately.  
 
   
 
Impacts of the marine construction as a whole in connection with VHE raised a real storm of 
remarks among citizens and their associations, nature conservation and fishing associations, 
and municipal authorities of Sipoo. Remarks warned of extensive negative impacts of such 
gigantic sand lifting, filling, dredging and dumping activities. Great worries were expressed 
of impacts on water currents, water quality, shore erosion, vegetation, ground water, fisheries 
and fishing. The nature conservation sites of the archipelago were feared to become 
endangered seriously.  
 
3.2.5. Marine construction vs. poisonous contaminants in sea bed sediments 
 
As regard to the EIA program, water and environmental authorities as well as fisheries and 
conservation associations paid attention to the fact that the construction of the harbor and its 
waterway would require large scale dredging in waters that had long time been loaded by 
contaminants from previous shipyard operations. Particularly, “existence of organic and un-
organic poisonous contaminants in the sea bed sediments” was seen obvious. It was feared 
that “heavy metals and organic contaminants had not yet been investigated sufficiently”  
 
In the EIA report and in the subsequent statements and opinions poisonous contaminants did 
not obtain as much attention as one may assume on the basis of the related remarks in 
connection with the EIA program. Some opinions on the EIA report foresaw that permitting 
of dredging and dumping would occur under the provisions of the upcoming instruction for 
dredging and dumping of contaminated sediments (IDDCS) that had been under revision but 
pending already some years. Obviously stakeholders thought that nothing more needed to be 
said at that time as the upcoming IDDCS and the WP processes eventually would take care of 
such contaminants anyway. 
 
3.2.6. Living conditions of people: healthiness, wellness, recreation   
 
In connection with the citizen inquiry, 35 % of answerers valued impacts of the harbor 
transfer on human health and wellbeing very significant. Air pollution, noise and disturbing 
light, for instance were experienced to have direct influence on wellness of the living 
environment and indirect influence on people’s health. In both respects the impacts were 
regarded significant.  
 
In the citizen inquiry, in the EIA report, as well as in a great share of statements and opinions, 
the subject issues were dealt with extensively. Healthiness, wellness and recreation values of 
the living environment were closely associated with cleanliness, peacefulness, quietness, 
freshness, or at least minimum levels air of pollution, dust, noise, stinks and other 
disturbances. Complete absence of unhealthy substances or other risk elements to human life, 
contact with un-spoilt nature, preserved heritage, opportunities for athletic, social and other 
hobbies and opportunities for positive esthetic experiencing were linked to healthiness, 
wellness and recreation values of the living environment, too.  
 
In statements and opinion in general, impacts of the harbor itself on air quality were seen 
limited. Instead, the emissions and energy consumption of all the traffic, created by the harbor 
in the new place and by the housing and business in the reconstructed old harbor sites, were 
seen as very significant environmental impacts. It was blamed that the assessment of these 
   
 
impacts in the EIA report of CH was far too negligent as compared to the requirements of the 
respective policies and conventions.  
 
In its concluding statement REC agreed with CH’s EIA report and many opinions in 
assumption that the harbor transfer would improve recreational quality in the down town. On 
the other hand, numerous opinions doubted air quality improvement in the down town. Many 
were doubtful of whether contaminated soils and other constraints in the old traffic areas 
would allow construction of residential areas that would be of high quality in healthiness, 
wellness or recreational terms.  
 
Many opinions from Vuosaari, Vantaa and Sipoo claimed that in the down town harbor traffic 
noise and light disturbances would subside in the background. On the contrary, at the new site 
and along the traffic connections, air pollution, dust, noise and light disturbances would 
dominate so far relatively quiet and disturbance free areas, areas that should be protected on 
their own right anyway.  
 
Citizens and their associations in the Sipoo archipelago reasoned that harbor traffic, besides 
air pollution, noise and light disturbance, would worsen living conditions also in terms of dirt, 
livelihood changes and heritage sites degradation. All these in concert would cause stress and 
have negative impact on human heath. In the open archipelago mitigation opportunities for 
noise and light impacts were regarded impossible.   
 
3.2.7. Compensation issues 
 
In its HMP and in the related EIA report CH made an account of various kinds of sites 
covered or affected by or otherwise related to the harbor and its traffic connections. If not in 
CH’s possession, HMP was based on reclamation of the necessary traffic areas and relied on 
related compensation procedures of the legislation.  
 
Prior to HMP and its EIA, CH had pursued nature conservation, and established protection 
and recreation sites in its eastern boarder area. Vantaa and Sipoo had protection and recreation 
sites in the same border area, too. Valuable nature and recreation sites were to be covered or 
impacted by the new traffic areas. CH was prepared to compensate nature lost under the 
harbor traffic areas and to continue its protection and recreation sites development in its 
eastern border area otherwise, too. 
 
In great number of opinions on the EIA report it was claimed that any compensatory 
arrangements would not compensate losses of nature under the harbor traffic areas or 
degraded in their vicinity. Values of natural sites, affected by VHE were seen impossible to 
compensate and as a founded reason to prevent the harbor from coming there. The interests of 
the affected land owners lead them to the same conclusion.  
 
As far as the marine construction is concerned, CH in its EIA report admitted that 
construction of the harbor and its waterway connections would have local impacts on fisheries 
and fishing. Fishermen and fishing associations demanded that all impacts to fisheries and 
fishing must be investigated, monitored and compensated to the full value.  
 
The municipality of Sipoo in its statement demanded that in addition to the harms and losses 
caused to any party by water blurring under the marine construction, also other harms and 
   
 
losses to ecology, fishing and recreation must be investigated, monitored and compensated. 
Similar views were raised by the citizens and their association in the archipelago. 
 
3.2.8. Eco-social landscape as an experienced transformation space  
 
From people’s trust and acceptance point of view, in connection with a major infrastructure 
endeavor such as VHE, it is significant whether citizens experience transformations they 
foresee in their relevant eco-social landscape as acceptable, or whether they at least can rely 
on that the project proponents and implementers are serious in paying attention to the valued 
qualities of their relevant eco-social landscapes. 
 
In the citizen inquiry, 25 % of answerers experienced the impacts of VHE on the landscape as 
very significant. The respective figures as regard to impacts on sea were 25 %, on cultural 
heritage 5 %, on recreation 40 %, and on wellness and health 35 %. In opinions on the EIA 
report qualities such as wholeness, permanence, familiarity, tradition, livelihood carrying 
form, cultural heritage, naturalness, tranquility, cleanliness, wellness, healthiness, esthetics 
and similar mind catching qualities seemed to have intermingled in people’s mind in their 
valuing their neighborhood landscape and experiencing VHE as a threat to it.  
 
In its EIA report CH aimed to process all the significant impacts into conclusions for decision 
making by using a mathematical multi-criteria model. Several opinions, even though they 
admitted that the model was interesting, cautioned that a great share of experienced impacts, 
particularly when the whole image of an eco-social landscape was at stake, was not possible 
to value meaningfully for such a model at all.  
 
CH concluded in its EIA report that landscape impacts would allow the harbor transfer to 
Vuosaari. CH reasoned, for instance, that one harbor in landscape terms is more favorable 
than two. The environmental committee of Helsinki noted on the other hand that harbor 
transfer would end oldest and strongest marine tradition in the down town Helsinki. 
 
Opinions on the EIA report were full of colorful language of how the Vuosaari harbor or its 
traffic connections are impossible on landscape grounds. Opinions were full of metaphoric 
expressions describing eventual transformations that VHE would bring to eco-social 
landscapes experienced critical and threatened. In those metaphoric expressions an overly 
heavy industrial complex would radically change, split or irrevocably destroy one or another 
extraordinary landscape, irreparable landscape wholeness or irreplaceable corridor. Several 
opinions demanded that preservation of wholeness, genuineness, tradition, splendor, and 
similarly experienced qualities should by no means be replaced by technical or legal 
arguments.    
 
Opinions revolved around five concentrations of landscape transformation worries: wide 
eastern landscape wholeness of tranquility and heritage, eastern nature and recreation 
corridor, Porvarinlahti-Mustavuori-Västerkulla, eastern Vantaa and Sipoo archipelago. 
 
The border area between Helsinki, Vantaa and Sipoo and beyond to east was recognized 
widely as a clean and tranquil landscape wholeness that mixed valuable countryside, coast, 
archipelago, nature, culture, recreation, living, and homestead elements well preserved so far. 
This mix was experienced to be rare and irreparable and therefore to be in need of protection 
   
 
on its own right. The mega-harbor with all its facilities and traffic would be in gross 
contradiction with the character of this eco-social landscape wholeness.  
 
The eastern border area was referred to form an indispensable element in the corridor between 
the northern Sipoonkorpi wilderness and the southern nature, recreation and residential areas. 
This corridor was regarded as a vital passage for flora and fauna complementation, as well as 
for human recreation routes to Sipoonkorpi from the south-eastern residential areas of 
Helsinki. The land traffic connections were feared to close or at least make this corridor less 
functional.  
 
The Porvarinlahti wetland, Mustavuori grove, Labbacka forest, Vikkulla and Österängen 
argicultural fields and Västerkulla manor estate were referred to form a valuable landscape 
entirety in which valuable biodiversity sites, traditional cultural heritage sites, image of clean 
agriculture, their protection and recreation intermingle in an extraordinary manner. The land 
traffic connections were believed to transform and split this eco-social landscape too 
radically.  
 
The city centre of Vantaa in Tikkurila and the Hanaböle fields northwest from it were referred 
to as highly valued landscapes. Their experienced values had played an important role already 
in early stages of HMP, when twisting on whether railway connection for the harbor in 
Vuosaari would be possible at all. In connection with EIA the railway to Tikkurila was seen 
in gross contradiction to the structural development priorities and adjacent recreation interests 
of Vantaa. As regard to the Hanaböle agricultural, heritage and recreational landscape, 
citizens, their associations, and museum authorities saw it as far too valuable to be split by the 
harbor railway.  
 
The archipelago southeast from Vuosaari belongs to the territory of Sipoo. This archipelago is 
well known for its recreation values and for its traditional homestead and livelihood character. 
These features were strongly advertised in statements and opinions on the EIA report. This 
eco-social landscape was referred to be particularly fragile in facing marine construction and 
traffic impacts of VHE. Impacts were claimed to cumulate into a serious stress to nature and 
to people living there and hence to destroy the character of the archipelago in ecological and 
social terms.  
 
3.2.9. People’s trust and acceptance 
 
At the time of HMP and EIA, an active fraction of citizens was in strong opposition to the 
harbor transfer and demonstrated their mistrust and in-acceptance at every opportunity. 
Particularly in n Vuosaari there were individual activists and citizen associations who 
categorically opposed GP92 of Helsinki that would double the population of the Vuosaari 
suburb and bring the harbor there. Some citizen associations used great amount of energy in 
working out thorough statements and media releases. They used environmental experts and 
lawyers in order to enhance the professional quality of their statements.  
 
In connection with its EIA program CH organized public meetings in major impact areas in 
down town, in Vuosaari, in Vantaa and Sipoo. Reportedly 131 citizens participated. The 
program meetings were blamed to have been consultant occasions. CH was blamed to have 
failed in hearing its citizens at earnest. About 50 citizens submitted their remarks on the EIA 
program.  
   
 
 
As a part of its assessment CH arranged a citizen inquiry in three major impact areas. 
Altogether 1800 questionnaires were administered, and 26 % of them were returned 
acceptably. CH used inquiry arguments as inputs to its mathematical multi-criteria model, 
which CH concluded to support the harbor transfer to Vuosaari. The results of citizen inquiry 
and conclusion based on them formed an essential part of the EIA report. Besides citizen 
associations, about 40 citizens submitted their opinions on the EIA report.  
 
The criticism on CH’s way of using citizen inquiry results was most fierce in Vuosaari, but 
critic was raised from down town Helsinki and alongside the traffic connections in Vantaa 
and Sipoo, too. The inquiry feedback was blamed to have been used manipulatively, biased to 
justify the pre-decided Vuosaari alternative. Some characterized the EIA report as a mere 
sales brochure.  
 
In Vuosaari there were individual activists and citizen associations who aimed to prove that 
the EIA process was not in conformity with the respective environmental legislation, and that 
the harbor there was impossible because of natural values in general, and because of the 
Natura plans in particular. In the light of the EIA experience in Vuosaari, a moderate scale of 
housing increase, buffer zones around the harbor, arranging the harbor traffic shortest way out 
from the suburb area and preserving nature corridor to the north-eastern wilderness, besides 
communicative governance approach, seemed to be key issues for earning people’s trust and 
acceptance. 
 
The land traffic connections in the vicinity of the harbor worried citizens around the border 
junction of all three municipalities, particularly because they would eventually jeopardize 
natural, recreational, cultural and human health values there. Here EIA was dealing with 
several road and railway alignment alternatives, and this offered in principle an opportunity 
for people to experience that they were heard for alternatives selection. Here the traffic route 
selection between various alignments as well as taking care of prevention and mitigation of 
harmful impacts in a way that honors people’s worries would be key issues for trust and 
acceptance. But the set up in which and birdlife values were against each other in alignment 
alternatives limited such an opportunity. 
 
Higher north along the traffic connections, there were several alignment alternatives set out 
for people’s opinions in EIA. Opinions generally, if not opposed the harbor transfer as an 
unnecessary wastage of tax payers’ money, reasoned for impossibility of one alternative or 
another because of the city structure, cultural heritage, landscape related or recreation reasons. 
Important for trust and acceptance would be if people could experience that they have been 
listened, not only heard. After selecting and developing tunnel solutions for the railway, safe 
construction of the tunnel in continuous reciprocation with people residing along its alignment 
would be needful for trust and acceptance. 
 
In the countryside and archipelago of Sipoo people mostly demanded a full stop for harbor 
plans in Vuosaari. The waterway alignments alternatives offered little difference from the 
people of the archipelago point of view. The difference was mostly related to the navigability 
vs. construction cost. The marine construction was seen to have wide-spread impacts anyway 
and mitigation opportunities were seen limited. Compensation issues would bee important 
anyway if plans were leading to intended marine construction. Here it would be hard to win 
acceptance also because people were uneasy with their fears of Helsinki pushing its urban 
community structure eastwards.  
   
 
 
4. Regional planning (RP) for co-existence of harbor and Natura 
 
4.1. Background for the Natura conflict in regional planning  
 
REC had concluded in its EIA statement that the local planning of traffic areas, given the 
wide impacts of the harbor to the environment, to the traffic and to the community structure, 
requires a ratified land use plan of general character. In practice this statement meant that 
harbor would be possible only if its traffic areas appeared in a ratified RP with legally final 
status. Accommodation of the traffic areas of the harbor road and railway had to be 
accommodated in GP of the eastern Vantaa, too. Naturally they had to appear in respective 
LPs, too, but at first the RP process. 
 
The EIA process had left the long tunneling under Vantaa to Kerava as the only alternative for 
the railway beyond Ring III. The harbor road would lead to the end of Ring III from the 
harbor. In the vicinity of the harbor, mainly ecological arguments made all the railway and 
road alternatives extremely challenging because of the valued nature protection sites there, 
and particularly because their inclusion in the Natura 2000 Network had to be taken into 
account.  
 
RP92, including the first traffic areas for the Vuosaari harbor and its traffic connections had 
been adopted by the Council of HPR and submitted to ratification in 1992. MinE ratified the 
traffic area for the harbor itself but denied ratification from the road and railway traffic areas, 
because the ecological conditions in relation to the protection site preparations there had not 
been clarified sufficiently (MinE, 1996). SAC denied ratification from all traffic areas and 
returned RP92, on the part of the harbor traffic areas, to HPR for re-preparation (SAC, 1996). 
Based on this ruling the RP process for the harbor traffic areas had to be re-started in 1996.  
 
The ratification consideration of MinE had taken so long time as it was waiting until it 
became clear whether the EU directives would bring any implications on the protection site 
preparations. Finland joined EU in 1995 and its directives became binding in VHE planning, 
too. The nature conservation site preparations in the vicinity of the planned harbor were 
diverted towards the Natura 2000 Network status of EU.  
 
The re-started RP process was difficult because of the ecological conditions around the 
Porvarinlahti wetlad and Mustavuori grove, because of the ecological and social conditions 
along the traffic corridor over Österängen and because of the social conditions along the 
railway tunnel to Kerava. The RP process was conducted under the provisions of CAct. From 
1995 onwards the EU’s Bird Directive and Nature Directive were applicable and binding and 
the national NCAct, legislating on the Natura 2000 Network developments, among other 
things, became effective 1 January 1997. Furthermore, the harbor and waterway construction 
as well as all tunnel constructions, would be subject to permitting under WAct, and such 
permissibility had also to be anticipated in connection with RP, too. The waterway had been 
included in the long term waterway plans of FMA, but whether this was sufficient from the 
RP’s point of view was an issue challenged, too. 
 
4.2. EIA expectations of high relevance in the RP process  
 
   
 
EIA of HMP had yielded a wide set of arguments against the harbor in Vuosaari that were 
relevant material against it in the RP planning context, too. EIA statements and opinions had 
suggested that while marginal benefits would be reaped in the down town Helsinki, living 
environments of valuable flora and fauna in a large scale manner and irrevocably would be 
destroyed in Vuosaari surroundings. Further it had been claimed that as the biodiversity 
protection here would require complete avoidance of intervening, the idea of harbor transfer 
should have been fully abandoned, and that any compensatory arrangements would not 
compensate nature lost under the harbor traffic areas or becoming degraded in their vicinity.  
 
The people’s worries on degrading of the conditions in the border area between Helsinki, 
Vantaa and Sipoo and beyond to east, expressed already in EIA, had particular relevance in 
the RP context. This area as a whole had been referred widely as a clean and tranquil 
landscape wholeness that mixed valuable countryside, coast, archipelago, nature, culture, 
recreation, living, and homestead elements well conserved so far. The preservation of the 
natural corridor between the Sipoonkorpi wilderness and the southern nature, recreation and 
residential areas had raised great worries. The harbor road and railway would be possible only 
by ensuring the corridor availability both for flora, fauna and humans, with minimal 
degradation to it. People had feared the mega-harbor would be a spearhead project in 
transforming this eco-social landscape fundamentally. A great number of people were living 
there, who were keen in preserving the above landscape qualities.  
 
On the other hand, social arguments in connection with EIA, justifying the removal of the old 
harbors away from the city centre, remained strongly valid. Social concerns were already 
taken into account after EIA in choosing between traffic alternative beyond Ring III. 
Accommodation of the ecological expectations in the Porvarinlahti- Mustavuori area, 
however, was difficult without putting the vegetation values and birdlife values against each 
other.  
 
4.3. Unusual planning orchestration in concert with RP planning 
 
As soon as the preconditions for the political decisions to locate the new harbor to Vuosaari 
had been confirmed and decisions made, orchestration of planning accordingly took off to full 
extend. PH proceeded into detailed planning of the new harbor and the planning department 
of CH proceeded into LP accordingly. RA, RWA and FMA joined their forces for detailed 
planning of the harbor road, railway and waterway, in order to define their detailed 
implementation conditions. The EIA expectations as a whole had confirmed that VHE was 
bound to face highly demanding ecological and social expectations in all its subsequent 
planning.   
 
RP was the most important threshold, and at first from 1996 onwards all planning focused on 
its. But soon planning orchestration in other respects intensified, too. LP, and the harbor, road, 
railway and waterway plans were brought up to an unusually detailed levels along the RP 
process. A vast number of studies and investigations were carried out, traffic connection 
alignments were refined, planning details were elaborated, innovative technical, and impact 
prevention and mitigation solutions were searched and incorporated into plans. All this work 
contributed to the legal clearance of RP, too, by producing detailed material. 
 
Already in connection with EIA, CH had been prepared to compensate nature lost under the 
harbor traffic areas and to continue its protection and recreation sites development in its 
eastern border area otherwise, too. The harbor itself was planned on a degraded shipyard and 
   
 
sand fill area. The old waste tip and other degraded areas were in demand of upgrading. 
Upgrading of such neighboring areas as buffer zones would simultaneously compensate 
recreation losses. It was important that the Harbor Centre became well connected in 
functional and visual terms to the rest of Vuosaari. In order to ensure best possible buffering, 
traffic, service and landscape connections, the LP planning assignment was expanded far 
beyond the harbor area only. Besides the degraded wasteland and coastal waters of the old 
shipyard and the other area necessary as the traffic area to the new harbor, the LP planning 
was expanded to cover the bordering waste tip and land fill areas, too. Also opportunities for 
new biodiversity protection sites, traffic areas more widely and other community services in 
the immediate vicinity of the harbor were taken into account in the expanded LP planning.  
 
In retrospect we know that first SAC’s ruling in June 2002, rejecting the appeals against RP, 
gave a firm ground for such a detailed planning that was carried out in concert with the RP 
process in the particular case of VHE. There was a risk of planning in vain but it did not 
materialize. Such a concerted planning was fruitful in many ways. Firstly it produced detailed 
material for reciprocating with the RP planning in its attempts to conclude traffic areas that 
would best meet the particular requirements. Secondly it confirmed that it would be possible 
also to implement the subject RP in such a way that ecological and social harms were 
minimized. This was important in ratification and court processes, but for public trust and 
acceptance more widely, too. Thirdly it brought detailed planning up to such a level that 
permit applications and construction work could be started very soon after the full clearance 
of RP. All this enhanced the eco-social reliability of VHE, by fitting the harbor and its traffic 
connections into the ecological, social, functional and visual conditions of the particular eco-
social landscape in a carefully considered manner.  
 
4.4. Porvarinlahti- Mustavuori and Natura most critical obstacle to RP 
 
The landscape wholeness of the Porvarinlahti wetland, Mustavuori grove, Labbacka forest, 
Vikkulla and Österängen argicultural fields and Västerkulla manor estate had been referred in 
EIA as an eco-social landscape, in which valuable biodiversity sites, traditional agricultural 
heritage, image of clean agriculture, their protection and recreation intermingle in such an 
extraordinary manner that VHE should never be allowed to destroy it. There was now way for 
the harbor to come to Vuosaari if these expectations were not seriously reflected in 
connection with the RP process and in the other planning orchestration in concert with it.  
 
Whether the project proponents had underestimated the EU’s Bird and Nature Directives and 
the upcoming NCAct prior their harbor transfer decisions in 1996, and whether they could 
have made the RP process smoother by their different action, can be debated. The re-started 
RP process for the traffic areas was to take six years from 1996 to 2002 before reaching 
legally valid ruling by SAC. During these six years, interests and values underpinning various 
demands became weighed and contested. In connection with the RP, LP and detailed planning 
processes and related legal twisting, the new environmental legislation, particularly the NAct, 
became thoroughly investigated and interpreted into precedent statements.  
 
REC in its concluding EIA statement had concluded that the land traffic connections of the 
Vuosaari harbor would have significant negative impacts on the natural wholeness of the 
valuable Porvarinlahti-Mustavuori area and its biodiversity. This significant weakening claim 
by REC was a heavy argument against RP and became actively re-circulated actively by the 
opposition. This had been a view presented in a large number of other statements and 
   
 
opinions, too. Ecological requirements had to play a dominant role throughout the RP 
planning, assessments and legal twisting.  
 
The ecological conditions and biodiversity values in the vicinity of the planned harbor were 
taken care by the NCAct and by the Natura 2000 Network site establishment there 
accordingly. The kernel of the RP challenge was in conformance of the harbor plans with the 
new NCAct and coexistence of the harbor with the upcoming Natura. But the land ownership 
interests intermingled in the same bundle with the biodiversity protection interests. The 
intermingled disputes escalated into a combined land use and environmental conflict 
throughout 1996-2002. Here it is important to notice that the Natura 2000 Network site no 
F10100065 (Mustavuori grove and Östersundom birdlife wetlands) became finally established 
first in 2000. All critical pieces in connection with the RP processwere in motion and 
benefited the finalization of each other. RP was under planning, NCAct and its Natura 
paragraphs were entering into force and in need of precedent interpretation, and Natura was 
under planning. 
 
RP for the traffic areas of the Vuosaari harbor was subjected to the Natura assessment 
immediately after NCAct became effective from 1 January 1997. The focus of the assessment 
was on whether the said RP has such impacts on the Natura site that, alone or in combination 
with other impact sources endanger the values of the said site.  
 
The Natura assessment was a process in which the protected values in terms of species and 
their living conditions were thoroughly examined. The harbor planners aimed to demonstrate 
that harbor and its traffic connections can be planned and constructed so, and traffic arranged 
so, and impacts mitigated so that no significant weakening of protected values occur. The 
Natura planners demonstrated that if the harbor was to come there Natura had to be  anyway 
safeguarded for what it was planned. Those opposing the harbor for one reason or another 
aimed to demonstrate that the harbor, despite of any mitigation, would significantly weaken 
the natural values that should be anyway protected.  
 
The mixture of various interests and other ambiguities led to an escalation of a lengthy 
conflict that became finally cleared by SAC’s ruling in June 2002. In connection with the long 
Natura conflict 1996-2002 most of EIA arguments against the new harbor were revisited, in 
media but in court processes, too. Whatever rights, interests and values were intermingled 
together, the legal processes boiled down to the issue of whether the eventual harbor weakens 
significantly the protected values of the new Natura site or not. In order to come into 
conclusion in this question, at first the boundaries and protected values of Natura had to be 
established, the implementation plans of the particular RP were brought up to such detailed 
level that all essential impacts and their mitigation were visible. First then the ruling of 
whether significant weakening of the protected values occurs could be possible.  
 
Natura and its particular values became ruled final by SAC in 2000. In the concerted 
planning, the harbor and its traffic became so arranged that any significant weakening of the 
protected values of Natura by no means would not occur. SAC, for its ruling of June 2002 
found, that such an implementation of RP, in terms of the related construction and traffic 
under strict conditions, prevention and mitigation would be possible that no significant 
weakening of those particular protected values for what Natura had been established would 
occur. Hence SAC ruled that MinE’s ratification of RP for the traffic areas the Vuosaari 
harbor in the end 2001 remains final. 
 
   
 
But investigations and interpretations had to be brought into very detailed levels before SAC 
could issues the above ruling. Section 4.5 below aims to depict the most crucial details and 
motivation of the related legal twisting.  
 
4.5. Legal twisting culminating at the Porvarinlahti railway bridge 
 
In process terms RP of VHE, the Natura FI10100065 and the interpretation of the NCAct 
were inseparably intertwined. Substantially the focus in the legal contestation was on whether 
the harbor construction and traffic, or more accurately whether the particular RP for the 
harbor traffic areas and the related LP for the harbor neighborhood in Helsinki territory were 
in conformity with the sections 65 and 66 of the NCAct, taking into account the Natura 
F10100065.  SAC in 2002 finally ruled that there was no hinders to the legality of the RP and 
LP in question. This was a threshold ruling for VHE to proceed.  
 
But the struggle to getting into that ruling from the conflict, involving a complicated bundle 
of ambiguities, was difficult and time consuming. Ultimately the legal twisting culminated at 
the planned bridge over the Porvarinlahti wetland bay. The project owners as infrastructure 
developers have actively pursued towards the final project and financing decisions. A couple 
of landowners in the immediate vicinity of the harbor have been in devoted opposition and 
used every opportunity to prevent the harbor from coming to Vuosaari. NCAct and 
particularly its sections 65 and 66 provided a new source for their appeal argumentation. The 
nature conservation activists, spearheaded by FANC, have acted as watchmen of the new 
environmental legislation, aiming to expand the boundaries and the protected values of 
Natura, to block the harbor from coming to Vuosaari, and to achieve complete case in law 
interpretation. These opponents and watchmen have pooled together in terms of money and 
expertise. The environmental authorities and the administrative courts, as a kind of referees, 
have proceeded with particular care in their legal interpretations, because precedent 
interpretations were missing and VHE was politically highly interesting. The law had to be 
interpreted thoroughly as it would yield precedent interpretations anyway.   
 
Significant in this debate is the mixture of scales. RP was an absolute threshold issue to the 
harbor. The whole harbor transfer could proceed or die here. Both the developers and 
opponents were well aware of this and were prepared to any lengths in order pursue their most 
central interest. For opponents it could be the last opportunity to stop the harbor from coming. 
Two bird species (Sylvia Nisorina and Lanius Cullorio) became focal actants in two extreme 
scales. On one hand they were local forest birds which were anyway moving their nesting 
sites along the natural transformations, for instance in the Porvarinlahti bay surroundings. On 
the other hand they were key actants, being strongly spoken for in the national or even EU 
level legal context. 
 
It is obvious that different scales of impacts were purposely mixed, and also narrow interest 
were camouflaged behind ecological argumentation when lobbying support and acceptance to 
one’s perspective in media, courts and people’s perceptions. A very interesting question arises 
at which metaphoric level individuals of the political decision making bodies, for instance, 
conclude their yes or no choices in decision making situations.  “Weakening of natural 
values” is a metaphoric expression that carries a richness of meanings and reached a status of 
a valuable social resource in opposing the harbor as a whole. Still the weakening of the 
natural values might be quite at a different scale ecologically than what is being transmitted 
message receivers. Significant metaphoric manipulation seems obvious.   
 
   
 
The conclusive ruling by SAC in June 2002 ended the legal twisting at the national level. 
Accordingly, the harbor as per the RP and LP conditions does not cause significant 
weakening of the particularly protected Natura values and there were no obstacles for 
construction of the harbor and its traffic connection in the terms of the CAct or any other 
legislation either. The opponents and watcmen appealed to EU and put the decision making of 
the Finnish jurisdiction in the VHE case into question there. EU Court closed the case late in 
2004 without questioning the rulings of the Finnish jurisdiction in the particular case.  
 
It is obvious that from the very onset differences in interests were so great and the legal 
interpretation issues at stake so fundamental that planning and decision making fully in 
negotiation without conflicts would have been unrealistic and even undesirable. SAC’s ruling 
produced the required interpretations and at the same time made the ground firm for the 
continuation of VHE. 
 
4.6. Birdlife, vegetation and groundwater monitoring committed 
 
As an important outcome of all the planning processes in connection with RP, the project 
owners committed themselves into extraordinarily extensive monitoring of birdlife and 
vegetation prior, during and after the construction. The birdlife and vegetation monitoring 
programs were finalized in 2001 and commenced in 2002.  
 
In some statements on the EIA report permitting of all tunnel construction had been 
demanded in accordance with the WAct provisions. REC in its concluding statement had 
joined to this view and cautioned the project owners to be prepared to plan tunnel 
constructions under the assumption that all of them require permitting according the WAct, 
besides other construction legislation. The tunnel constructions were planned, permitted and 
monitored accordingly. The respective WPs stipulated strict conditions and led to extensive 
monitoring of developments in ground water, watershed conditions, well and soil depressions 
from 2003 onwards  
 
The water quality and fisheries monitoring in the relevant marine areas continued whole the 
time since the early nineties.  
 
5. Organization of construction under strict permitting and monitoring   
 
5.1. Construction management 
 
After CHH and the Parliament in the end of 2002 concluded the construction and investment 
decisions, VHE moved into the project implementation mode from the early 2003 onwards.  
The state traffic administration departments (RA, RWA and FMA) formed their joint project 
implementation organization (VUOLI) for construction of the harbor road, railway and 
fairway, on behalf of State. For these project partners, construction of roads, railways and 
waterways is routine activity, even though the extensive tunnel construction in sensitive 
ecological, groundwater, legal and social conditions set particular requirements in this case. 
PH, on behalf of CH formed its own project organization for the harbor construction within its 
technical office. The old harbors had been developed, constructed gradually by PH over a 
long history. The construction of the completely new, large scale harbor was tremendously 
greater challenge to PH than anything before in their recent history.  
 
   
 
The concerted planning in connection with the long RP contestation had brought the plans for 
the harbor road and railway up to a detailed level and the readiness for their construction was 
at a good level when the time was ripe for its commencing in early 2003. But as regard to 
marine construction the situation was different. PH and FMA had submitted their joint 
application for WP for harbor and waterway construction in 1997. It took until 2002 before 
SAC could rule it legally final. For FMA waterway construction was routine, but PH was not 
able to strengthen its project implementation capacity as required by the time marine 
construction commenced in the early 2003. In May 2003 surprising encountering of 
alarmingly high contents of organic ten (TBT) substances in sea bed sediments halted 
dredging and caused a crisis in harbor construction. As alarming TBT contents were found in 
the harbor area only, construction of the waterway could continue. The joint marine 
construction arrangement between FMA and PH became dissolved. Impacts monitoring 
continued as joint operation, however.  
 
The harbor road and railway construction, as well as the waterway construction were 
continued by VUOLI, being supported by thorough preparations, detailed plans, permit 
conditions, risk assessments and risk management plans, monitoring programs and public 
relations activities. Based on these preconditions and extensive project experience, the 
construction of the harbor road, railway and waterway proceeded in a controlled manner and 
earned increasingly the appreciation of the general public, too. These construction activities 
were accompanied by extensive birdlife, vegetations and water conditions monitoring.  
 
But the harbor construction was struggling from summer 2003 onwards in its TBT crisis, 
being initially able to continue construction activities only in limited areas. But measures to 
recover from the TBT crisis were taken soon. First step for recovery was the reorganization of 
the project office of PH. Public relations and legal services were organized as coordinated 
joint activities together with VUOLI, so was the environmental data bank and its interactive 
internet service. VUOSA had to grow in competence to master the magnitude of all 
challenges posed by the TBT crisis, and so it did. Soon problem solution search was going in 
cooperation a variety of related stakeholders, as described in the following sections.  
 
5.2. Water permits (WP) regulating marine construction 
 
WAct legislates that WP is required as an advance control measure in marine all marine 
construction. WP is granted by a particular state permit authority EPA (until 2000 Water 
Court). WP consideration and granting is based on interest comparison and WP has to be 
granted if no absolute permit hinder exists. By its character interest comparison is a kind of 
cost-benefit comparison. Permit conditions form essential contents of WP. Their aim of 
conditions is to direct the implementer to develop its plans so that preconditions for permit 
granting prevail. Part of permit conditions focus on obligatory monitoring that will facilitate 
for implementation control. Even though permitting for the harbor and waterway construction 
is decided under WAct WP has to be also in conformity with the provisions of the EPAct, and 
NCAct, for instance.  
 
CH had been carrying out voluntary monitoring of the marine environment, water quality and 
fisheries since 1991 in sea areas eventually being subjected to impacts of the planned harbor, 
its waterway and traffic. The purpose of the voluntary monitoring was to provide base line 
data for upcoming planning, permitting and monitoring. 
 
   
 
Water and environmental authorities as well the municipality Sipoo, in their EIA statements, 
had demanded that all harms by marine construction and traffic of the harbor, whether to the 
marine environment, fisheries or  people shall be investigated in detail, prevented, mitigated, 
monitored and compensated. Citizens and their associations in the archipelago had demanded 
full stop to the harbor transfer in first place but strictest WP process anyway. Fishermen and 
fishing associations in connection with EIA had preferred harbor development at the old sites, 
and demanded that all impacts to fisheries and fishing must be investigated, monitored and 
compensated to the full value anyway. These issues had to be taken into account in 
connection with the WP application, processing and granting.  
 
EIA had been carried out in an early planning stage. EIA had met its legal purpose but had 
been blamed for being superficial as regard to the marine construction components. Much of 
assessment requirements were loaded into the subsequent detailed panning and permit 
processes. In its concluding statement, REC had concluded that more elaborate assessments, 
and prevention and mitigation plans were necessary before any permitting of massive sand 
lifting, sand filling, dredging and dumping activities could be possible. REC had also 
demanded that the dumping area of dredging masses had to be transferred into a more suitable 
place, and that the quality of the dredging masses had to be investigated more closely in order 
to decide their handling and locating. REC in its concluding EIA statement had also cautioned 
project proponents to be prepared for the fact that the additional investigations as well as the 
treatment and disposal of the dredging masses were bound to meet the requirements of the 
upcoming IDDCS. This norm was under preparation at the time of EIA. Detailed 
investigations were required for the WP application at latest.  
 
5.3. Original WP - failure in initial dredging - TBT crisis 
 
PH and FMA submitted their WP application to Water Court in 1997. In retrospect we know 
that the quality of the application fell far short of the expectations of  EIA described above. 
Particularly sediment investigations were unsatisfactory. Despite of all deficiencies Water 
Court concluded in 1998 to grant a joint WP but with separate sections for the harbor and 
waterway. Water Court took the deficiencies in sediment investigations into account in the 
permit conditions. The conditions demanded detailed investigation of the sediment quality 
and the approval of investigation results by REC before any construction activity could 
commence. The conditions included also requirements for the monitoring program.  
 
But then a long idle time followed. WP was appealed to AC and then to SAC. As WP had to 
make sure that there was no absolute hinder existing to permit granting, and as NCAct could 
be a basis for an absolute hinder, it became obvious that SAC could not finalize its ruling on 
WP until RP had been ruled final in June 2002. SAC ruled WP final in October 2002 and the 
last threshold for the construction and investment decisions was removed. Responsible project 
organizations of PH and FMA moved into construction as described above. 
 
Unfortunately PH had not noted all permit conditions adequately. Despite of four years time 
from permit granting to its finality, PH had failed to carry out sediment investigations 
properly. The joint monitoring program with FMA was being updated but otherwise detailed 
preparations for construction commencing did proceed properly. Just before entering into 
dredging PH carried out some sediment investigations and submitted them to REC for 
consideration. PH, however, did not wait REC’s approval before entering into dredging in 
May 2003. There were watchful eyes of FANC and others ready to recognize that the 
   
 
dredging was not in conformity with the permit conditions. A great public storm followed. 
REC stopped dredging with an immediate effect. 
 
The way how the TBT crisis emerged, undermined seriously the public trust on the new 
harbor in general and on the capability and ethics of its builders in particular. The ecological 
degradation in terms of major harm to the marine ecology and fisheries, and the human health 
risking in terms of unhealthy seafood were causing extremely serious concerns. Media 
reported greatly how the harbor builders lawlessly dredge sediments with alarmingly high 
TBT contents and spread such poisonous stuff around the coastal waters of Vuosaari, 
endangering ecology and human heath.  
 
Crisis atmosphere took over. The TBT crisis halted most of the harbor construction, with the 
highest uncertainty of what was to follow. The dredging in most of the harbor area was 
blocked until solutions for safe treatment of TBT contaminated sediments could be found. 
Construction could be only gradually re-opened as much as REC considered safe and 
interpreted to be in its authority to allow within the provisions of the original WP. As the 
alarming levels of TBT appeared in the harbor construction area the continuation 
opportunities of PH were limited whereas FMA could well continue it its waterway 
construction. 
 
In retrospect we know that the project owners, particularly CH and PH were careless not only 
in their WP application but in their construction preparations and dredging commencing, too.  
But the environmental administration failed, too, in two important respects. REC failed in its 
duties to control that the permit conditions were honored. MinE had failed in up-dating its 
IDDCS -norm in pace with the increased recognition of TBT substances as greatly harmful 
substances in all ship building and ship traffic environments.  
 
5.4. TBT crisis and its solution in historical perspective  
 
Laiho (2007) concludes that legislation on contaminated sea bed sediments had been far less 
developed than on contaminated soils on dry land. TBT-hazards in Vuosaari had not been 
caused willfully but they had accumulated by mistake, as legislation was lacking behind. 
Tightened limit values for different treatment options are means for the society to take 
responsibility of hazards caused by historical carelessness. Knowledge of TBT and related 
substance was still very limited in 2003 when the TBT crisis of VHE burst out. Technologies 
required by their cleaning were missing or at least they were excessively expensive to large 
scale uses. 
 
Only drafts were available of IDDCS during the original WP process 1997-2002 and at the 
unfortunate commencing of the dredging activities in May 2003. Finalization of IDDCS was 
to take until 19.5.2004 by MinE. Consideration of treatment options and respective permit 
conditions from this date onwards could occur on the basis of established limit values and 
respective guidelines. IDDCS cleared away some uncertainty and confusion that had 
prevailed among stakeholders when TBT related, widely used chemicals was increasingly 
recognized as dangerous substances. Since 2004 TBT and related contaminants in sea bed 
sediments could not any more be underestimated or neglected. The TBT crisis of VHE 
formed a historical turning point. The failures in commencing of dredging operations lead to 
collective learning among all stakeholders. 
 
   
 
The TBT crisis forced CH and PH into serious reorientation. It alerted REC into extreme 
vigor for correcting the situation. It expedited MinE in their sluggish norm updating work. 
And it energized many others among science institutions, expert organizations, opposition, 
citizenry and media.  
 
In the heights of the TBT crisis CH and PH revised their project approach. The VUOSA 
project was established, separated from the rest of the city administration, provided with 
sufficient financial resources, strengthened with experienced expert resources and backed 
fully by the top of the city administration. The first challenge of VUOSA was to develop such 
permissible solutions to the TBT treatment that the construction of the harbor to its full 
readiness was possible.  
 
Permitting of the TBT removal provided excellent opportunities to put the new harbor 
fundamentally into question again or otherwise to challenge the permitting and related 
activities. Every permit was appealed to court. The construction work proceeded, despite of 
numerous appeal processes, on the basis of the action allowances of each permit. In 
connection with the TBT related WPs, the permit applicants had learned to make there base 
work and applications so thoroughly that appeals did not change the construction activity in 
question or prolong directly the total construction period since started. Since all the TBT-
related WPs had been ruled final by SAC by 2005, the legal twisting on whether the harbor in 
Vuosaari was possible or not, was over.  
  
At emergence of the TBT crisis it was not just a couple devoted opponents who wielded 
mistrust and in-acceptance on the harbor progress. Public hearings in connection with the EIA 
and RP processes had not emptied people’s interest to remark, complain and appeal against 
the harbor construction. The TBT incident increased antagonism and anger.  
 
All in all, the solutions for the TBT removal, isolation and treatment into harbor structures, 
along the rest of the harbor construction work, required 7 particular WPs under WAct and 2 
other permits under EPAct.  
 
5.5. Innovative “control room” - way out of crisis  
 
The search for TBT removal solutions and their permitting took the years 2003-2005 keeping 
VUOSA, EPA, REC and the other environmental administration, opposing parties, expert 
organizations, lawyers, courts and several other parties busy with these processes. The TBT 
removal and harbor construction activities became expanded in pace with the permit maturity. 
All the marine construction could be completed so that the harbor was opened to traffic in 
schedule in November 2008.  
 
When the alarming levels of the TBT substances were recognized in May 2003, the harbor 
construction soon developed into a kind of research and learning process. The greatest 
challenge in this context was in finding such an environmentally acceptable, technically 
possible and economically feasible solution for the combined TBT removal and harbor 
construction that could allow for permitting, implementation and learning, despite of 
ambiguities and uncertainties involved.  
 
The “crisis atmosphere” did not last long before VHE was overtaken by “highly innovative 
brainstorming” in the “extended control room “, as some interviewees put it in the research 
interviews of 2003. Along the gradually unveiling truth of the quality of sediments and active 
   
 
search for solutions the organization of VUOSA grew in competence, and so did the 
responsible environmental administration and other related stakeholder, becoming jointly 
capable to finding way out from the TBT crisis. That productive period certainly enhanced the 
eco-social reliability of VHE but produced great benefits for environmental friendly marine 
construction practices more widely, too.  
 
Immediately after recognition of TBT, REC and PH entered in unusually deep and intensive 
co-operation between each others, however so that the control role of REC was not corrupted. 
VUOSA fed in investigation data, operations results and solution proposals. REC allowed 
expansion of dredging operations as much as it felt safe and considered to be in conformity 
with the original WP. VUOSA and REC reciprocated also with science and expert 
organizations and provided feedback to MinE in their IDDCS work. Important part was public 
relations. REC, VUOSA and MinE, all issued continuously news on developments in the 
internet. Innovative co-operation between the project implementers, relevant authorities, 
expert organizations and research institutions led into enhanced norm work, innovative 
construction and monitoring solutions and best practice publications.   
 
TBT removal involved new solutions that were first time submitted for permit consideration, 
under changing of reference norms. VUOSA discussed also with EPA in pre-testing of most 
innovative elements of the solutions, with understanding of the character of the strictly 
independent permit authority. Impacts of the marine construction on human health, marine 
environment, water quality and fisheries have received high attention throughout the solution 
development and respective permitting. 
 
The TBT crisis and all the recovery measures prompted up-to-date knowledge on TBT in 
sediments, innovative removal and construction solutions, effective mitigation measures and 
modern monitoring techniques. Importantly, all the TBT related WPs brought significant 
additional features into the monitoring programs that were up-dated accordingly. In 
connection with construction implementation, besides more traditionally followed impacts, 
TBT contents had to be monitored regularly in sediments, mussels and fish. New measuring 
techniques and practices for some impact indicators had to be introduced, as such techniques 
for TBT, for instance, had been missing in Finland. 
 
In retrospect we may recognize that the TBT crisis, even though putting the whole harbor 
construction into question once again, turned into a success story from the eco-social 
reliability point of view. The remarks on the EIA program had already expected poisonously 
contaminated sediments in the shipyard waters but then the issue had not become addressed 
adequately. First the TBT incident of May 2003, draw stakeholders attention to the issue on 
the level it deserved.  
 
5.6. Strict permitting, monitoring and follow-up  
 
All in all the terrestrial and marine construction activities of VHE became directed by an 
extensive structure of key decision and permits under the environmental legislation. Rämä 
(2008) makes a summary of the key decisions and permits. Accordingly 40 decision or 
permits were so significant that they became appealed to AC and then to SAC, mostly on the 
basis of the environmental legislation. Besides the above highly contested major decisions 
and permits, at least a similar amount of less significant permits for particular work sites and 
particular activities were granted and administered under the provisions of the various 
   
 
enactments of environmental legislation. Each significant decision or permit set its conditions 
for the subsequent steps. 
 
CH had been carrying out voluntary monitoring of the developments in the marine 
environment, water quality and fisheries since 1991, extensive birdlife monitoring since 2002, 
vegetation monitoring in selected risk zones since 2002 and groundwater conditions and wells 
monitoring along the railway alignment since 2003, all prior to the construction commencing. 
The permits expanded the monitoring programs by adding and redefining the monitoring 
indicators, monitoring practices and the ways to follow up the monitoring results in collective 
processes. VUOSA and VUOLI incorporated the monitoring reports as an integral part of the 
environmental data service (EDS) that was open to anybody through the internet. 
 
In good quality monitoring, reciprocal discourse set out in EIA continues so that project 
owners and other stakeholders continue joint processing of the EIA expectations around 
concrete plans, actions and impacts. In this reciprocation, monitoring programs become 
expanded and updated in order to best cover the essentials of the unveiling reality. Initially 
after harbor decision the EIA feedback did not receive all the attention desirable. It took some 
time before the project owners, particularly PH, took the EIA feedback properly in the 
subsequent steps. Certain features of the Natura conflict and of the TBT crisis, for instance, 
prove that the project owners were rather forced to go back to the EIA feedback and recognize 
that certain statements would have earned better attention. But by 2003 lessons had been 
learned and the project owners had chosen the environmental excellence as one of their major 
goals and reorganized their project governance accordingly since then.  
 
Monitoring is effective when monitoring results are used for corrective measures and improve 
mitigation outcome. At best monitoring results are used actively as feedback in project 
management on one hand and for informing project developments and impacts to the public 
and stakeholders on the other. In their master theses Laiho (2007) and Heikkilä (2007) 
evaluated VHE’s environmental monitoring programs and the usage of their results, in 
comparison with the respective issues in some other large scale infrastructure projects. They 
concluded that environmental monitoring in VHE has been extraordinarily extensive, has met 
the purpose and functioned well, in comparison to experiences fro elsewhere . Monitoring as a 
whole has consisted of a strong set of voluntary and obligatory monitoring elements. 
Voluntary monitoring before the construction activities produced valuable base line data. The 
voluntary programs have been complemented in accordance with the obligatory permit 
conditions. Monitoring results have been followed up and used for both project management 
and public information. Besides meeting the needs of VHE, the monitoring programs have 
served science and other wider interests.  
 
Impacts on vegetation, birdlife, ground water, watersheds, wells, soil depressions, and in 
terms of noise and trembling have been well monitored under terrestrial construction 
(Heikkilä, 2007). Impacts, such as spreading of water blurring, physical and chemical water 
quality, marine vegetation and micro fauna, sedimentation, ten and heavy metal substances in 
sediments, organic ten substances in mussels, organic ten and mercury substances in fish, 
spawning of Baltic herring, reproduction of selected fish species, and impacts as experienced 
by fishermen have been well monitored in connection with marine construction (Laiho, 2007).  
 
Emissions into air have not been monitored during the construction, not direct impacts on 
human health. Such monitoring might prove more critical in the actual traffic conditions. As 
regard to effectiveness, VHE abounds of examples in which monitoring feedback has led to 
   
 
corrective measures. One feature of the effectiveness of monitoring is that since EDS and 
reciprocity in communication was systematized, VHE earned quickly trust and acceptance of 
wide audience. 
 
The monitoring results by 2003 gave base line data of conditions before construction 
activities. The monitoring results of 2003-2008 depict changes in marine environment and 
fisheries, in birdlife and vegetation, and in conditions of groundwater, watersheds and wells 
during the construction activities. The monitoring results beyond 2008 eventually tell about 
the environmental status after completion of the construction activities. So far monitoring data 
beyond construction completion is limited but accumulates along the coming years.  
 
The birdlife monitoring continues until 2012. The vegetation monitoring continues until 2011 
leading to conclusion report then. The monitoring of ground water conditions and potential 
depressions in the tunnel areas continues until 2015. The monitoring of the marine 
environment, water quality and fisheries from 2008 onwards continues in the context of the 
operational monitoring of the harbor traffic.  
 
From 2008 onwards the environmental permit for the harbor operation requires additionally 
following kinds of monitoring activities for the harbor operation and traffic. In connection 
with the traffic statistics, traffic of hazardous chemicals and other dangerous cargo shall be 
particularly monitored and reported.  Emissions to air as well as noise levels shall be 
monitored and controlled. Any changes in the operation characteristics shall be noted in 
operational monitoring, as shall be any accidents and risk situations, too. Disposal of problem 
waste shall be continuously organized and monitored. 
 
6. Key lessons learned from VHE 
 
6.1. Fundamental expectations of EIA as basis for the rest of the endeavor 
 
Projects have been typically conceptualized in a linear planning and implementation 
continuum, in which a project owner produces a project plan, get it assessed in the EIA terms, 
and if possible and feasible, implements it. In such continuum EIA easily is a one-off gate 
passing activity without taking seriously advantage of the EIA feedback for the rest of the 
project.  
 
VHE evolved slowly into HMP. But then its EIA led quickly to the final HMP. Many EIA 
statements emphasized the multidimensionality of the harbor transfer decision, the importance 
to bring various perspectives with their underpinning values in the decision making and the 
necessity to proportionate individual impacts in the wider decision making entirety. Besides 
the environmental priorities, the structural development of the capital city region towards 
closer community structure, development of the traffic system as a whole, developing harbor 
traffic towards increased competition, and socio-economic feasibility of the harbor transfer as 
a whole were raised as particular reference points in the final decision making. The final HMP 
aimed to improve the decision making basis by additional socio-economic calculations, for 
instance. The harbor transfer decision by CCH was made accordingly and it was followed by 
a set of subsequent decisions and agreements that mobilized implementation planning.  
 
EIA was significant particularly in guiding the selection of road, railway and waterway 
alignments. But when studying of the EIA material, by already knowing what has passed in 
   
 
later planning and construction phases, one may recognize that warnings of all difficulties and 
twisting points were already there.  In connection with EIA, authorities demanded in concert 
additional investigations and assessments, as well as more detailed prevention, mitigation and 
monitoring plans as preconditions for the harbor decision and beyond it. REC reminded 
project developers to be well prepared to deeper investigation and assessments in connection 
with the upcoming planning and permit processes. 
 
The EIA process as whole brought together all pertinent parties within CH and state traffic 
administration, hence forming coalitions in the project proponent side. Respectively it brought 
suburban citizen associations, nature conservation associations and prominent landowners 
into groups that were prepared to use the best environmental lawyers and other experts in 
challenges the harbor transfer for one motive or another. Co-operation organizations 
responsible for regional land-use and traffic system developments, as well as environment 
related authorities were brought into closer understanding of VHE as a whole. 
 
The RP process with all its complication surfaced a great part of the EIA expectations again 
and triggered related monitoring. Afterwards it has been learned that the responsible project 
planners and implementers, particularly in the organization of PH, had not fully internalized 
the EIA expectations. The TBT surprise proved that the environmental authorities were not in 
full alert either. 
 
Public opinion and hard line opposition forced both the responsible project offices and the 
pertinent authorities to improve their performance. And they improved to high degree. 
Gradually most of the expectations resulting from the HMP-EIA process have become taken 
into account in detailed planning, permitting, implementation, monitoring and collective 
follow-up. As in 2010, we know that VHE has well met most of the expectations socially 
constructed in connection with the HMP-EIA phase.  
  
6.2. Complication inherent but approachable 
 
In connection with EIA, the eventual future of VHE was seen as a great a complication, in 
which it is impossible yet to foresee all impacts, many impacts involve value based 
ambiguities, interests of various stakeholders collide, many impact contain uncertainties, and 
many important issues will unveil only gradually along the upcoming processes. Impacts will 
materialize in different scales, in different points of time, in different environments that 
themselves are subject to changes all the time.  
 
The phases of VHE confirm the characteristics of complication foreseen in EIA. Abundant 
material is available of how various kinds of ambiguities, uncertainties and complexities have 
been approached, resolved successfully or not so successfully. In connection with the RP 
process the complication was dominated by all kinds of ambiguities. In the TBT crisis, a 
considerable amount of uncertainties were involved. The railway tunnel construction, instead, 
was mostly engineering challenge, full of complexities, with various levels of calculable risks 
involved. The above are examples among a great variety of complications. 
 
It is obvious that most problems have been in the complexity categories and become resolved 
successfully by best practices of scientific project and risk management. But these tools have 
had little help alone in the most difficult problem bundles, where ambiguities caused the 
greatest difficulty. In the Natura conflict, ambiguities played very important role initially and 
throughout. The role of scientific project management was at its best in continuing stubbornly 
   
 
the planning orchestration to the unusual levels. This work supported the legal process by 
producing details of the structures to be constructed and details for the mitigation 
opportunities as well. In the TBT case uncertainties played most important role. Serious 
ambiguities were related to the true character of the uncertainties. After recovery from the 
TBT surprise, scientific expertise gradually alleviated uncertainties for possible solutions. 
 
6.3. Nested strategy governed in extended control rooms 
 
All the complications, even the most difficult ones, have become gradually worked out into 
solutions that allowed the harbor transfer initiators, project owners and project implementers 
to pursue towards their ultimate technical and economic goal, the opening of the new harbor. 
Finally this goal was achieved. But the project pursuers were at first forced by conflicts and 
crises into such learning that the true characteristics of complication became understood. In 
subsequent reorientation, the parallel goals in carrying out such a major transformation in 
such a sensitive eco-social landscape became internalized. The environmental administration 
and other stakeholders grew also in competence to handle the complication and the parallel 
goals in their eco-socially reliable governance practice.  
 
Project owners and implementers learned to work in concert with each others and with 
various authorities and expert organizations. So did the parties who for reason or other wanted 
to challenge the advancement of VHE, too. Ultimately key people from amongst the project 
pursuers, opponents, environmental authorities, permit offices, control offices, associations 
etc. jointly have formed “control rooms”, with changing participation, depending on the focus 
issue of the particular occasion. High stakes and complication has demanded from each 
participant capacity and courage to search for innovative technical solutions but innovative 
co-operation, too. Environmental excellence, in fact the eco-social reliability, was gradually 
the common denominator between the stakeholders. The extended control room that sorted 
out the TBT crisis is a prime example of such a co-operation. 
 
Respective control rooms could be easily depicted from the RP context in general and from 
the concerted planning orchestration in connection with it, for instance. The same can be said 
of the deliberations towards HMP. A list of significant milestones prior the harbor transfer 
decisions were introduced earlier in this analysis.  When such a milestone list was compiled 
together with several interviewees in summer 2003, one of them expressed himself in the 
following way.  
 
 “The most important turning points can be seen in the fundamental agreements and public 
decisions. But in true sense, the road to these agreements and decisions has been paved by 
incredible amount of deliberation, negotiation and interaction in various group 
combinations.”  
 
The background for the above wording was, for instance, in the struggles to find out a 
possible railway solution to the harbor in Vuosaari. Such a solution had been searched 
intensively over the years 1991-1994 in formal working groups and committees and informal 
gatherings, between technical staff and between political decision makers.  
 
Until the harbor transfer decision all processing of issues and perspectives occurred in the 
network deliberation mode of governance. Since the harbor transfer decision had been made 
certain parties were made responsible for goal oriented orchestration of the plans and 
preconditions for the harbor in Vuosaari, without any other alternative. But the future was 
   
 
only partially in the hands of the responsible project planners. At the heights of the Natura 
conflict, for instance, a plenty of essential developments occurred in network deliberation, in 
which the responsible project planners could participate sometimes with their own agenda and 
other times captives to agendas fully set by others. 
 
Since the implementation decisions were made the terrestrial and marine construction were 
segregated on their own paths, with responsible organizations each. The terrestrial 
construction of the harbor road and railway, and also the waterway part of the marine 
construction, could quite entirely act in the project management mode. But after the TBT 
incident, the control room sorting the way out of the TBT crisis, had to act also in process 
orchestration and network deliberation modes. The update of IDDCS, for instance, was an 
issue of national level interest and VUOSA at its best could be only a deliberation party to 
MinE. Since 2003 Vuosa had to put aside a great part of the plans made for harbor 
construction and return thoroughly to the planning orchestration mode, again Simultaneously, 
however, construction implementation occurred in a limited scale, as allowed by REC within 
the original plans and WP. And this partial implementation served both the planning 
orchestration and network deliberation by feeding data of the emerging conditions and 
experiences. 
 
In the governance of the harbor construction beyond the TBT incidence, all the three 
governance modes were mixed and the combination of the parties, active in the control room 
kept changing on daily basis, depending on the issue at focus. The thrust and acceptance of 
people, ecological and human health and the progress towards the harbor completion, all these 
were at stake every day. And the extended control room managed to govern all of them 
reliably to success outcomes. All this is a prime example of eco-socially reliable governance 
by an extended control room. 
 
6.4. Evolving metaphors as tools for communication and contestation  
 
The following wording by a senior officer in the project owner’s organization in a research 
interview in summer 2003 is indicative to the actual governance of very complicated issues 
infrastructure development endeavors. 
 
“The real thinking of the key individuals in critical contest situations is known to those 
individual persons only. The entire history of VHE is so complicated that it is hard, if not 
impossible to draw any definite flowcharts between influential events and mental models 
behind them”.  
 
Mental models of people are behind people’s subscribing to certain perspectives and 
contesting on behalf of certain perspectives. Appealing metaphors are influential in evolution 
of mental models. This notion has significance in achieving and maintaining people’s trust 
and acceptance in contested issues.  
 
The promoters of the new harbor could achieve the trust and acceptance of people by a 
combination of good performance in true action and of good performance in metaphoric 
contestation. In the implementation phase possibilities to demonstrate good action increased, 
but unfortunately the most critical contestations were fought in earlier phases and solely in the 
symbolic world. There appealing metaphors most obviously played significant role.  
 
   
 
Throughout VHE the promoters of the new harbor have tried their best in using strongest 
arguments on behalf of their case. So have done the competitors and devoted opponents, too, 
promoting their case each, each from their own perspective. Sometimes camouflaging behind 
another more appealing perspective occurred, too.   
 
EIA provided a medium for all stakeholders, to numerous institutions, and to a great number 
of citizens to formulate their expectations and get them registered. A majority of 
argumentation in opinions on the EIA report was against the harbor in Vuosaari, while in the 
EIA report itself arguments were mostly in favor of the harbor transfer to Vuosaari.   
 
In the RP process, there was the decision already that the harbor will be constructed to 
Vuosaari, as soon as RP is processed ready. In this connection the argumentation became 
thoroughly focused on conflict between the harbor and the Natura, and was formulated for the 
legal contestation at courts plus for getting public understanding on ones perspective.  
 
In connection with TBT crises a tremendous amount of substantial work was done in offices 
for tailoring a set of solutions and preparing unfailing permit applications for their 
implementation. At the same time an intensive discussion was going in media, in which the 
opposition aimed to prove harbor construction too risky because of TBT and irresponsible 
project management. The project implementers argued how the harbor construction is a safe 
way for correcting an old hazard.   
 
Even though new arguments in favor of or against VHE were introduced in all major problem 
situations, some arguments proved long lived and were used repeatedly by circulating them in 
plans, appeals and media. Gradually most significant metaphors develop into social resources, 
carrying strongly the perspective that motivates it. An interesting question arises, at which 
metaphoric level individuals of the political decision making bodies, for instance conclude 
their yes or no choices in decision making situations.   
 
In light of the analysis so far, it obvious that the different scales of impacts have become 
purposely mixed for particular interests, in lobbying support and acceptance to one’s 
perspective in media, courts and people’s perceptions. “Weakening of natural values” is a 
metaphoric expression that carried a richness of meanings and reached a status of a valuable 
social resource in opposing the new harbor. On the other hand, “common good” had 
obviously similar significance as a social resource in promoting the new harbor.  Significant 
metaphoric manipulation seems obvious.   
 
Interestingly, the metaphoric expression of “spreading of TBT”, from action point of view has 
had to opposite meanings: spreading by action vs. spreading if no action is taken. Here is a 
clear analogy with the saving Natura by the harbor vs. saving Natura from the harbor 
(Hukkinen and Roe, 2002).  
 
6.5. Framework for key elements of eco-socially reliable governance  
 
Eco-social reliability here is conceptualized as sustainability materializing tangibly 
throughout an infrastructure endeavor, in its process and outcomes. Eco-social reliability 
means the caretaking of the ecological and social concerns equally with the techno-economic 
project performance ambitions. 
  
   
 
Governance of an infrastructure endeavor occurs in nested windows of social construction 
type of network deliberation, process management type of project planning and techno-
scientific project implementation management. Foundations for the eco-social reliability are 
set in the outer governance windows of network deliberation and planning orchestration. 
Project implementation, when facing significant and surprising ecological and social 
concerns, reverts back to these windows again.  
  
The essence of the eco-social reliability is in the sensitivity to and in the wise addressing of 
ecologically and socially motivated ambiguities. 
  
Eco-social reliability is typically at stake in complicated problem issues and related incidents. 
When a complicated problem issue emerges it is at first important to place it to the most 
applicable sub-category of the complication categories and to attempt get resolved 
respectively. Partially resolved problem often becomes a set of problems in the other sub-
categories.  
 
Assumptions are made here, based on experiences from VHE, that technical and economic 
problems are mostly complexity matters for scientific project management. When ecological 
and human health matters in the infrastructure context are seriously at stake, then 
uncertainties play a significant role. Many motives, however, are behind ecological and 
human health claims, as they are more appealing than narrow interest claims, for instance. 
When serious contestation emerges then most probably a mixture of socially motivated 
ambiguities is involved. Unbundling of ambiguities is an obvious key to getting onwards in 
such situations. 
 
Ambiguities provide the necessary variety of building blocks and their addressing provides 
the necessary level of consensus that brings the eco-social reliability forward within and 
between the respective governance windows.  
  
Eco-socially most significant ambiguities frequently combine differences in values, interests, 
understandings, and precaution attitudes. Such ambiguities in often cases become highly 
politicized. They demand contestation in a variety of participatory, panning, legal and other 
forums that jointly form the virtual control room of the endeavor. The analogy of the control 
room is applicable to all of the governance windows as the focus is on dealing with 
differences in meanings people bring to issues in collective decision making of a particular 
endeavor. Most complicated problem bundles require extended control rooms, capable to 
flexibly moving between various governance windows.   
  
The meaning processing and governance practice that occurs in the virtual control room, if 
conducive to eco-socially reliability, addresses all the ambiguities, uncertainties and 
complexities and leads to mutual learning that combines the essential features for goal 
achievement, ecological care, human-social good and trust optimally, at each point of time. 
Evolving metaphors, as developing into social resources, act as significant tools for variety 
and consensus in such learning. 
 
 
